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Abstract 
There are increasing signals that countries that negotiate on GHG emission control are unlikely to sign and ratify a 
single climate protocol, even though almost all countries have subscribed the UNFCCC convention that sets the 
framework of international climate cooperation. In addition to the US decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, 
New Zealand and Australia recently led to the formation of a new alliance in which technological cooperation is 
the main tool to achieve GHG emission control. In the U.S., some States on the Eastern coast are negotiating to 
adopt emission reduction targets and to establish a permit market despite the opposition of the federal government. 
Cooperation on climate policy is also the objective of recent negotiations between ASEAN countries. Given this 
background, this paper aims at examining whether the aforementioned events are simply the noise of a political 
process leading to a global agreement on climate change control or are instead consistent with some basic 
economic incentives that are pushing countries towards the formation of two (or more) parallel climate blocs. To 
this aim, this paper uses a well known integrated assessment climate-economy model to evaluate the incentives to 
cooperation in climate negotiations for the main world countries. A game-theoretic framework is adopted to 
analyse a country’s incentive to belong to a climate coalition. In our setting, a given country can either join one of 
the existing climate coalitions or can propose a new one or can decide to free-ride on the other countries’ 
cooperative abatement effort. We then analyse the characteristics of the main possible outcomes and assess which 
outcomes are most likely to prevail in future negotiations, at least as far as economic incentives are concerned.  
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INCENTIVES TO COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS 
 
1.  Introduction  
The lack of a credible strategy to include some large greenhouse gas emitters, in particular the US, 
China and India, among the signatories of the Kyoto Protocol has questioned the current approach to 
strive for a global top-down climate change protocol. Yet, countries across the world have committed 
to the overall idea behind climate policy by signing the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), which sets the framework to work against the climate change threat. At 
the same time, awareness on the potential scope of climate change seems to grow across the world 
countries, as evidenced for example by the relevance this topic had at the G8 summit in Gleneagles in 
the Summer 2005. However, consensus on the approach to design and implement climate change 
control appears to be missing. 
 
Recent developments in international climate policy stress the growing importance of taking the single 
countries’ incentives and specificities into account. After the top-down process of Kyoto negotiations, 
where overall binding emissions targets have been assigned to the different countries, there is an 
increasing tendency to focus more on domestic and/or bi-lateral climate-friendly activities than on 
global emissions targets. Initiatives by small groups of countries can also be observed. 
 
In July 2005, the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate has stressed technology 
cooperation as a key tool to contribute to climate policy. This agreement – signed by the US, 
Australia, Japan, China, India and South Korea – constitutes a voluntary, technology-based initiative 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions without legally binding emissions targets. Its basic idea is to 
cooperate to develop new technologies and to deploy these technologies in developing countries. 
Other bilateral agreements on technology and climate change indicate the attractiveness of this 
strategy. For example, in September 2005, the European Union and China agreed to strengthen 
cooperation and dialogue on climate change and energy issues, with a special focus on clean coal 
technology (Cf. Buchner and Carraro, 2005a, for a description of the main technological agreements).  
 
                                                      
*This paper is part of the research work being carried out by the Climate Change Modelling and Policy Unit at Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 
and has been presented at the CESifo David Bradford Memorial Conference on “The Design of Climate Policy”. The authors are grateful to 
Christian Egenhofer, Frank Convery, Johan Eyckmans, Henry Tulkens, two anonymous referees, and the participants at the FEEM-Stanford 
Conference on “Post 2012 Climate Policy: Architectures and Participation Scenarios” in Venice, 20-21 June 2005 for helpful suggestions and 
remarks. The usual disclaimer applies.  
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The emergence of cooperation between small groups of countries can be noticed also by observing 
some recent developments in emission trading markets. In Europe, the Emissions Trading Scheme was 
officially launched in January 2005. The system cover around 15,000 installations in 25 countries and 
6 major industrial sectors. Similarly, in August 2005, Canada announced the establishment of the 
Canadian Offset System. The Canadian government released its plan to encourage the creation of 
greenhouse gas emission reduction (GhG ER) domestic offsets, including the introduction of domestic 
emissions trading. At the end of September 2005, after months of internal government debates, also 
Japan’s Ministry of Environment announced its decision to set up a voluntary domestic emissions 
trading scheme, beginning in April 2006 with an initial coverage of 34 manufacturing companies.  
 
At the same time, a wide variety of initiatives are in preparation at state and local level in the U.S., 
notwithstanding the opposition of the federal government to commit to binding international climate 
policy goals. In particular, several US states in the North East are attempting to set up an emissions 
trading scheme within the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), whereas numerous other states 
are implementing serious climate change strategies, as evidenced by California’s call for a return to 
1990 emissions levels by 2020. California is also the leader in the negotiations on a GHG trading 
scheme amongst three Pacific Coast States. In addition, New Mexico has become the first US state in 
September 2005 to sign up for voluntary emissions trading at the Chicago Climate Exchange, pledging 
to reduce its state government’s GHG emissions by 4 per cent by 2006. 
 
The aforementioned policy developments signal the evolution of climate policy towards a set of 
multiple initiatives/agreements, in which a single country or a small group of countries unilaterally 
adopt policy measures to combat climate change. Yet, to our knowledge, no sound analysis has been 
performed in order to verify whether the events described above correspond to some basic underlying 
economic incentives that make it convenient for countries to commit to unilateral or small group 
policy measures or whether these tendencies simply reflect a new round of political episodes, i.e. the 
noise of a political process leading to a global agreement on climate change control. 
 
Therefore, the main objective of this paper is to appropriately assess the main world countries’ 
incentives to cooperate on GHG emission control, i.e. to participate in a climate coalition. This will 
enable us to understand whether the equilibrium of the policy process is actually characterised by a 
global climate coalition or rather by a set of fragmented climate regimes in which several small 
coalitions emerge. To this aim, this paper uses the FEEM-RICE model, a well known integrated 
assessment climate-economy model, and some tools of non-cooperative coalition theory to identify the 
equilibrium coalition structure that could emerge out of climate negotiations. In order to be able to 
unravel the basic economic incentives, we keep the policy framework as simple as possible, without  
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capturing all the details of the recent policy developments. For example, in our setting, climate 
negotiations only centre around the stringency of the environmental target.  
 
The main assumption in our analysis, and its major novel feature with respect to previous empirical 
analyses of climate policy, is that a global agreement is only one of the possible outcomes of climate 
negotiations. According to their own economic interests, countries are also free to form regional or 
sub-global agreements. In particular, a given country can either join one of the existing climate 
coalitions or can propose a new one or can simply decide to free-ride on the other countries’ 
cooperative abatement efforts. Each climate coalition allows the implementation of the flexible 
mechanisms (emission trading) within the coalition in order to guarantee an efficient implementation 
of the environmental targets adopted within the coalition. This framework is meant to mimic the recent 
developments in climate policy described above, where we can observe the emergence of various 
carbon markets across the world, with countries participating in one of these markets (Cf. Victor, 2006 
for a discussion of this policy framework). 
 
Let us finally stress that the focus of our research is on economic incentives faced by countries. There 
are several other political, cultural, and environmental factors that could influence a country’s decision 
to join a given climate coalition, which will not be addressed in this paper. However, the economic 
dimension of climate negotiations has evolved as one of the key aspects in the international climate 
debates (and has often been considered as the most important one in the US). As a consequence, this 
paper can provide a relevant, albeit partial, contribution to the analysis of the future evolution of 
international climate policy. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 will review the main results that coalition theory 
provides on the formation of multiple coalition in a non-cooperative framework. Section 3 will 
describe the theoretical setting and the empirical model used for our analysis. Section 4 will present 
our main results. Finally, a concluding section will present the main policy implications of our work 
and will discuss some future research directions. 
 
2.  Regional and sub-global climate blocs. Lessons from coalition theory. 
 
The strategic choice of players who decide whether or not to form a coalition with other players and, if 
they do, with which specific players to cooperate, has been the subject of recent research in game 
theory.
† Many of these recent studies are based on a non-cooperative approach where binding 
                                                      
† Most papers have been presented at the annual workshops of the Coalition Theory Network (see 
www.feem.it/ctn). Some of them are published in Carraro (2003) and in Demange et al. (2005).  
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commitments are excluded. This approach is particularly suitable for analysing the likely outcomes of 
future negotiations on climate change control, because no supra-national authority exists that can force 
countries to adopt policy measures to reduce their GHG emissions. Let us therefore examine the 
indications that the non-cooperative theory of coalition formation provides for the analysis of climate 
negotiations.    
 
The study of coalition formation poses three basic questions (Cf. Bloch 1996): (i) which coalitions will 
be formed ? (ii) how will the coalitional worth be divided among members ? (iii) how does the 
presence of other coalitions affect the incentives to cooperate? The traditional cooperative game 
theory (Cf. Aumann and Drèze, 1974) focuses on the second question – the division of the payoff 
between coalition members. The first question has been assumed away in most cooperative game 
theory and the third one is simply ignored, since the coalitional function cannot take into account 
externalities among coalitions. 
 
These limitations have led to the emergence of a new strand of literature describing the formation of 
coalitions as a non-cooperative, voluntary, process. In the non-cooperative approach, a player’s 
decision to join a coalition is often modelled as a two stage game. In the first stage, a player 
independently decides whether or not to join, by anticipating the consequence of his/her decision on 
the economic variables under control. In the second stage, he/she sets the value of these variables, 
given the coalition structure formed in the first stage. Under the simplifying assumption that the 
second stage equilibrium is unique for any coalition structure, the first stage game can be reduced to a 
partition function, which assigns a value to each coalition in a coalition structure as a function of the 
entire coalition structure. This enables us to capture the important effects of externalities across 
coalitions. 
 
The theoretical literature on the non-cooperative coalition formation has shown that, even without any 
commitment to cooperation and even in the presence of positive spillovers (i.e. in the case in which 
the formation of a coalition by some players increases the payoff of the players outside the coalition, 
as for public good provision), countries may form a coalition. 
 
The equilibrium coalition structure depends on several key assumptions, i.e. the membership rule, the 
order of moves, the players’ conjectures, the slope of their reaction functions (Cf. Carraro and 
Marchiori, 2003). Nevertheless, some conclusions seem to be robust with respect to these assumptions 
and the related equilibrium concepts. For example, if a treaty is signed by many countries (i.e. a large 
coalition is formed) the amount of public good provided by the coalition (e.g. the amount of GHG 
abatement) is very close to the non-cooperative business-as-usual one (Barrett, 2002). As far as the 
goal of this paper is concerned, the most important conclusion is as follows. If countries are free to  
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decide not only whether or not to sign a treaty but also which treaty (i.e. which coalition to join), there 
is generally more than one coalition at the equilibrium. For example, in the case of trade negotiations, 
there may be several trade blocs. In the case of environmental negotiations, several regional or sub-
global climate agreements. 
 
This conclusion can be found for example in Bloch (1995, 1996), Ray and Vohra (1997, 1999), Yi 
(1997, 2003) and Yi and Shin (1995). The models used in these studies analyse the formation of 
multiple coalitions by adopting different notions of stability. Bloch (1995, 1996) examines an infinite-
horizon “coalition unanimity” game, in which a coalition forms if and only if all potential members 
agree to form the coalition. Ray and Vohra (1997) assume the “equilibrium binding agreement” rule, 
under which coalitions are allowed to break up into smaller sub-coalitions only. Yi and Shin (1995) 
investigate the “open membership” game, in which non-members can join an existing coalition even 
without the consensus of the existing members. Different membership rules lead to different 
predictions about stable coalition structures (Cf. Carraro and Marchiori, 2003). For example, the ”open 
membership” rule is unlikely to support the grand coalition as an equilibrium outcome. The 
equilibrium coalition structure is generally very fragmented. By contrast, the “coalition unanimity” 
rule and the “equilibrium binding agreements” rule support more concentrated coalition structures at 
the equilibrium, but quite often not the grand coalition (Cf. Finus and Rundshagen, 2003). 
 
The above results have been used by Carraro (1998, 1999) to argue that the Kyoto Protocol was 
unlikely to be signed by all the relevant countries and that the emergence of parallel climate blocs was 
likely. However, economists are not alone in suggesting that climate negotiations may lead to multiple 
fragmented climate agreements. Some indications that multiple climate blocs could be the outcome of 
future climate negotiations can also be found in the political science and legal literature (see, for 
example, Egenhofer, Hager and Legge, 2001; Stewart and Wiener, 2003; Reinstein, 2004). As Victor 
(2006) says: “evidence that governments are taking the climate challenge seriously will come in the 
form of fragmented and variegated markets rather than integrated systems”. 
  
However, no economic analysis has already quantified the incentives for negotiating countries to form 
multiple climate coalitions and identified which countries belong to which coalition. This paper is a 
first attempt to fill this gap.  
 
3.  The Model 
3.1  The Theoretical Framework 
Coalition formation is modelled as a two-stage game. There are n players N {1,...,n} =  that are 
countries or world regions in our empirical model and which we simply refer to as countries in the  
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following discussion. In the first stage, countries choose their membership: a country can either join 
coalition Si and become a signatory or remain a singleton and non-signatory. These decisions lead to a 
coalition structure S = (S1, S2, …Sk, lk), if k coalitions form and the remaining players are singleton.  
In the second stage, countries choose their economic strategies. At this stage, it suffices to denote the 
vector of economic strategies by  1n (S) ( (S),..., (S)) ω= ω ω , given that k coalitions have formed in the 
first stage; we can also note that in the second stage countries receive individual payoffs  i(( S ) ) πω  
that depend on the economic strategies of all countries.
‡ 
The subgame-perfect equilibria of this two-stage game can be computed by backward induction. To do 
this, it is sufficient for strategies to constitute a Nash equilibrium at every stage. For the second stage, 
this entails that economic strategies form a Nash equilibrium between coalitions Si, i=1,…k, and non-
signatories.
§ That is: 
** *
iS S iS S S iS iS ( (S), (S)) ( (S), (S)) (S) −− ∈∈ πω ω ≥ πω ω ∀ ω ∑∑  and  
                    ( 1 )  
iS ∀∉ : 
** * * *
iS i i iS i i i ( (S), , (S)) ( (S), (S), (S)) (S) −− πω ωω ≥ πω ω ω ∀ ω . 
where  S(S) ω  is the economic strategy vector of coalitions S1 … Sk,  S(S) − ω  the vector of all other 
countries not belonging to S1 … Sk,  i (S) ω  the strategy of non-signatory i, and  i(S) − ω  the strategy 
vector of all other non-signatories except i under coalition structure S. An asterisk denotes equilibrium 
strategies. 
 
Computationally, this implies that non-signatories will choose their economic strategies so as to 
maximize their individual payoff  i() πω, whereas all signatories j∈Sh jointly maximize the aggregate 
payoff of their coalition Sh. Strategically, this means that the behaviour of non-signatories towards all 
other countries is selfish and non-cooperative; signatories behave cooperatively towards their fellow 
members (otherwise cooperation would not be worthwhile analyzing), but non-cooperatively towards 
outsiders. Economically, this means strategies are group (but not globally) efficient within coalition S. 
 
                                                      
‡ This simple theoretical framework has often been adopted in the literature on international environmental 
agreements where the assumption of a coalition structure with a single coalition is the most obvious and realistic 
and where the game is characterized by positive externalities. A more general framework is sometimes used in 
coalition theory (Bloch, 2003) but would not be useful for the purpose of  this paper.  
§ This has been called a partial agreement Nash equilibrium by Chander and Tulkens (1997). Our analysis is in 
line with the mainstream of the literature on coalition theory. For an overview, see Bloch (2003) and Yi (2003).  
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Given that the second stage of the game has been solved, let us define 
*
ii v( S ) ( ( S ) ) =π ω  as the 
valuation of country i if the coalition structure S forms. This definition succinctly summarizes all 
information relevant  to the second stage. 
 
For the first stage, a Nash equilibrium in terms of participation can be computed.
** The following two 
conditions must be met: 
Profitability. A multiple coalition structure S is profitable if, when a coalition Si∈S forms, all players 
j∈Si, ∀i, receive a payoff larger than when no coalition forms, i.e. vj(Si; S) ≥ vj(1; S
1) where S
1 is the 
coalition structure where all players are singleton. 
Stability. A multiple coalition structure S is stable if each coalition Si∈S is internally stable, externally 
stable and intracoalition stable. It is internally stable if no cooperating player would be better off by 
leaving the coalition to form a singleton. Formally: vi(Si; S) ≥ vi(1; S’) for all players in the coalition Si 
and all coalitions in S, where S’= S\{Si}∪{Si-1,1}. It is externally stable if no singleton would be 
better off  by joining any coalition belonging to the coalition structure S. Formally: vi(1; S) ≥ vi(Si; S”) 
for all players who do not belong to Si or to any other non-trivial coalition in S, where S”= 
S\{Si,1}∪{Si+1}. It is intracoalition stable if no player belonging to Si would be better off by leaving 
Si to join any other coalition Sj∈S. Formally: vi(Si; S) ≥ vi(Sj+1; S°) for all players in the coalition Si 
and all coalitions in S, where S° = S\{Si,Sj}∪{Si-1, Sj+1}. 
 
That is, at the equilibrium, no signatory belonging to coalition Si∈S, ∀i, has an incentive to leave its 
coalition in order to become a non-signatory, given the participation decisions of all other countries. 
By the same token, no non-signatory has an incentive to join coalition Si, given the decisions of all 
other countries. And no player wants to move from one coalition to another one. 
 
As shown below, the set of stable coalitions may be empty, i.e. the asymmetries between players 
and/or their different incentives to free-ride and/or to join a specific coalition may be such that no 
coalition structure is both profitable and stable. 
3.2  The Empirical Model 
The analysis of the possible outcomes of the dynamic process that defines the incentives to participate 
in a climate agreement has been carried out by using a modified version of Nordhaus’ RICE model 
(Cf. Nordhaus and Yang, 1996) in which endogenous and induced technical change are modelled. In 
                                                      
** This definition of coalitional stability is due to d´Aspremont et al. (1983) and has been frequently applied in 
the literature on international environmental agreements, as for instance by Barrett (1994), Carraro and 
Siniscalco (1993), Hoel (1992) and by many scholars afterwards.  
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our version of the model, called FEEM-RICE (Cf. Buonanno et al., 2002), technical change performs 
a twofold role: on the one hand, via increasing returns to scale, it yields endogenous growth; on the 




In the model, six countries/regions (US, EU, Japan (JPN), former Soviet Union (FSU), China (CHN) 
and the rest of the world (ROW)) optimally set the intertemporal values of four strategic variables: 
investments, R&D expenditure, abatement effort and net demand for emission permits. Countries play 
the two-stage game described in sub section 3.1. Given the interdependency of countries’ decisions, 
and the dynamic nature of the RICE model, the equilibrium value of the control variables is the 
solution of a dynamic Nash game. More precisely, we adopt the PANE - equilibrium concept 
introduced by Eyckmans and Tulkens (2002) and used in several other papers (Cf. Eyckmans and 
Finus, 2005; Carraro, Eyckmans and Finus, 2006).  
 
We can provide here only a short overview of the FEEM-RICE model, a more detailed description can 
be found in the Appendix (see also Eyckmans and Tulkens, 2002 for a description of a modified 
version of the RICE model). The economic module of FEEM-RICE consists of a long-term dynamic, 
perfect foresight Ramsey type optimal growth model with endogenous technical change. The decision 
variables are investments, R&D expenditure and carbon emission abatement. The carbon cycle and 
temperature change module are the same as in RICE. In each world region and at every time period t, 
a regional budget equation describes how gross production, Yi,t , can be allocated to consumption, Zi,t, 
investment, Ii,t, emission abatement costs, Yi,tCi(μi,t), and climate change damages,Yi,tDi(ΔTt). 
 
Gross production can be interpreted as “potential GDP”, that is, what could be produced in the absence 
of the climate change problem. Abatement costs are an increasing and convex function of emission 
abatement effort. Abatement effort measures the relative emission reduction compared to the 
Business-as-usual scenario (BAU) without any abatement policy. Climate change damages are an 
increasing and convex function of temperature change ΔTt. Abatement costs and climate change 
damages are treated as proportions of “potential production”. Hence, total costs and damages are the 
product of costs and damages with “potential” production Yi,t , respectively.  
 
Every region is characterised by a production function that maps combinations of capital stock Ki,t and 
labour input Li,t into output. The production technology is assumed to satisfy constant returns to scale 
of the Cobb-Douglas type. Labour supply is assumed to be inelastic. Capital accumulation is described 
                                                      
†† The FEEM-RICE model has already been used in Bosello et al. (2003), Bosetti et al. (2005), Buchner and 
Carraro (2005a, 2005b, 2006), Buchner et al. (2005) and Buonanno et al. (2002).  
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in the standard way. In our version of the RICE model, investment is divided into physical and R&D 
investments. The former adds up to the existing stock of capital. The second modifies the productivity 
parameter in the production function and also affects the emission-output ratio (see the Appendix for a 
detailed presentation of the equations). 
 
Production gives rise to emissions of greenhouse gases. In FEEM-RICE, emissions are proportional to 
“potential” output. Emissions accumulate in the atmosphere according to a standard linear stock 
externality accumulation process. Carbon concentration is translated into temperature change 
according to an increasing function. Welfare of each country is measured by its aggregate lifetime 
discounted consumption.  
 
In addition to the model structure, two assumptions qualify our results
‡‡. First, all countries/regions 
which adhere to the Kyoto/Bonn agreement are assumed to meet their Kyoto target from 2010 
onward.
§§ We therefore adopt the so-called “Kyoto forever” hypothesis (Manne and Richels, 1999). 
Our reference to the Kyoto/Bonn agreement is partly imprecise since, for the sake of brevity, we will  
at times call the “Kyoto protocol” or “Kyoto/Bonn agreement” a “Kyoto forever” scenario.  
 
Second, cooperating countries are assumed to adopt cost-effective environmental policies. In 
particular, cost-effective market mechanisms (e.g. emission trading) are chosen over “command-and-
control” measures in order to guarantee an efficient implementation of the environmental targets 
adopted within the coalition. Please note that Annex B countries that belong to a coalition and 
therefore engage in emissions trading face their Kyoto targets, whereas China is assumed to agree to a 
10% reduction of emissions with respect to the BAU scenario over the whole time horizon if it accepts 
to participate in a coalition (and in emissions trading). If various sub-global coalitions form, then they 
are assumed to behave independently, without a link between them (i.e., there is no trade between all 
regional blocs on a common market). This latter assumption mimics the present configuration of 
permit markets (Cf. Victor, 2006). 
 
                                                      
‡‡ Please note also that our analysis focuses only on CO2. There are other man-made greenhouse gases and the 
Kyoto Protocol takes some of them into account. Moreover, both the Bonn agreement and the subsequent 
Marrakech deal emphasise the role of sinks in meeting the Kyoto targets. As shown by several recent analyses 
(e.g. Manne and Richels, 2001; Jensen and Thelle, 2001), the inclusion of the other greenhouse gases and of 
sinks would further reduce mitigation costs . 
§§ The use of the “Kyoto forever” hypothesis may be seen as a strong assumption. However, the CO2 
concentration levels implicit in this assumption (if FEEM-RICE is a good description of the world) coincide with 
those in the A1B scenario (IPCC, 2001) which can be considered the “median” scenario among those currently 
proposed. We thus use the “Kyoto-forever” hypothesis not because it represents a realistic scenario, but as a 
benchmark with respect to which policy alternatives can be compared.  
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Using the FEEM-RICE model, we will analyse the incentives to move away from the present situation 
where the EU, Japan and Russia are committed to complying with their Kyoto targets and where the 
other countries/regions are free to determine their climate policy unilaterally. Therefore, our 
benchmark case, or business-as-usual scenario, to which we compare different potential climate 
regimes, is the coalition formed by the Annex B-US countries. 
 
Our focus is on post-2012 scenarios. We assume that a global agreement is only one of the possible 
outcomes of climate negotiations. Countries are also free to form regional or sub-global agreements. 
Therefore, we consider situations in which countries that now belong to the Kyoto coalition may 
decide, according to their own economic interests, to leave the Kyoto coalition and cooperate on GHG 
emission control with other countries/regions
***. The time horizon over which climate policy is 
optimised is 2010-2100. When analysing the decision to leave or join a coalition,  we adopt the “open 
membership” rule, that implies that non-members can join and leave an existing coalition even without 




In this section, we plan to identify the stable coalition structures of the game.
 For this purpose, we 
compare different regimes both with respect to the benchmark climate coalition formed by the Annex 
B-US countries, and with respect to all other different regimes. Comparisons will be performed in terms 
of each region’s payoff (total domestic welfare). In order to limit the number of coalition structures to 
be compared, we simplify the policy framework as follows. First, given that the inclusion of the least-
developed countries is very unlikely in the next stages of climate negotiations, the rest of the world 
(ROW) is exempted from potential short- to medium- term emission reduction commitments. The 
player ROW is thus a free-rider in all our policy scenarios. Symmetrically, given its strong 
commitments to emission reductions, Europe cannot be a free rider, i.e. it always belongs to a climate 
coalition. 
 
Given these constraints and the FEEM RICE model, our first conclusion is as follows. No coalition 
structure involving the five negotiating players (ROW is always a free rider) is internally and 
externally stable. This result is consistent with previous findings using the RICE model (see, for 
example, Bosello et al. 2003 –  where only one coalition structure was found to be stable – and 
                                                      
*** Notice that the rest of the world (ROW) has been exempted from possible future climate commitments due to 
policy indications, which suggest that an inclusion of these countries is very unlikely in the next stage of climate 
negotiations.   
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Carraro, Eyckmans and Finus, 2006 – where no stable coalition could be found in the absence of 
transfers).
††† 
This result suggests that stability analysis does not seem to be useful to analyse the future prospects of 
climate policy unless one wants to conclude that only unilateral measures are likely to be implemented 
in the future. This obviously depends on the model used for the empirical analysis and on the 
abatement targets assumed for the next negotiation stages (in Buchner and Carraro, 2005b, we 
analysed whether different future emission targets could increase the prospect for a stable coalition, 
but this was not the case). It also depends on the absence of transfers (in Carraro, Eyckmans and 
Finus, 2006, the introduction of transfers is shown to yield some stable coalition structures) and on the 
initial allocation of emission rights (Bosello et al., 2003, show that more equitable allocations slightly 
increase the number of stable coalition structures). 
 
In this paper we adopt a different approach. Rather than looking for additional instruments (transfers, 
allocations of emission rights, linkages with other economic issues
‡‡‡) that may yield a stable coalition 
structure, we will use the payoffs associated to all feasible coalition structures as indicators of each 
region/country’s preferences for different alternative coalition structures, i.e. we will identify the most 
preferred coalition structures for each country/region of the world and then analyse whether these 
preferences can help identifying a coalition which is likely to be chosen by an ample set of countries. 
In doing so, we will also check whether a given coalition structure is at least profitable to all 
countries/regions belonging to a coalition.  
 
Our results are summarised by Tables 1a, 1b and 2. Tables 1a, 1b show the ranking of climate 
coalition structures according to domestic welfare. Table 2 shows the ranking of climate regimes 
according to global welfare and global emissions. These tables may provide information that enables 
us to identify the most likely behaviour of countries in future climate negotiations (at least to the 
extent that economic incentives affect climate negotiations).  
 
Let us first focus on the US. The two most preferred coalition structures are the ones in which the US 
is not involved in any climate coalition (see Table 1a). Note that the US’s most preferred regime is the 
present Annex B-US coalition. However, the US’s most preferred regime when it participates in a 
climate coalition is the one in which the US cooperates (and trades) with China, whilst a second 
                                                      
††† The result in this paper is slightly stronger than in Bosello et al. (2003) because of the additional constraints 
imposed on some players of the game (e.g. ROW is always is a free rider) and because of the more demanding 
target assumed for China. 
 
‡‡‡ The role of issue linkage in explored in Buchner et al. (2005).  
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cooperative bloc is formed by the Annex B-US coalition, i.e. the US prefers the coalition structure 
[(JPN, EU, FSU), (USA, CHN)].  
 
The ranking of climate coalition structures for the other two main industrialised countries – EU and 
Japan – shows some similarities. Both the EU and Japan rank the present Kyoto coalition very low, 
thus suggesting that a post-2012 change is likely. And both rank cooperation with China quite high. 
Indeed, the coalition (JPN, EU, CHN, FSU) is the EU’s most preferred regime, while Japan ranks first 
the coalition structure consisting of two blocs, the Asian bloc (JPN and CHN) on the one hand and the 
European bloc (EU plus FSU) on the other. In both cases, the EU and Japan can profit from either a 
large emission permit market or at least the presence of an important permit supplier, which implies a 
low permit price and thus low abatement costs. The worst regime for the EU (and for Japan) is the one 
in which the EU and Japan form a coalition without having any large permit supplier at their disposal.  
 
Table 1a. The ranking of climate regimes according to domestic total welfare: US, JPN and EU 
 
USA JPN  EU 
(JPN, EU, FSU)  (EU, FSU)  (JPN, EU, CHN, FSU) 
(JPN, CHN) & (EU, FSU)  (JPN, CHN) & (EU, FSU)  (USA, JPN, EU, CHN, FSU) 
(JPN, EU)  (JPN, EU, CHN, FSU)  (JPN,CHN) & (EU,  FSU) 
(EU, FSU)  (USA, JPN, EU, CHN, FSU)  (EU, FSU) 
(JPN, EU, CHN, FSU)  (JPN, EU, FSU) & (USA, CHN)  (JPN, EU, FSU) & (USA, CHN) 
(JPN, EU, FSU) & (USA, CHN)  (JPN, EU, FSU)  (JPN, EU, FSU) 
(USA, JPN, EU, CHN, FSU)  (USA, JPN, EU, FSU)  (USA, JPN, EU, FSU) 
(JPN, EU) & (USA, FSU)  (JPN, EU) & (USA, FSU)  (JPN, EU) & (USA, FSU) 
(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)  (JPN, EU)  (JPN, EU) 
 
 
Note that the coalition structure [(JPN, EU, FSU), (USA, CHN)], i.e. the climate regime in which the 
US and China cooperate within one bloc, whilst EU, FSU and Japan cooperate within a second bloc, is 
ranked fifth both by the EU and by Japan. However, there are also some differences in the preferences 
of the EU and Japan. In particular, large coalitions are more preferred by the EU than by Japan.  
 
Let us analyse the preferences of  less developed countries – China and the FSU. China acts as a 
rational free-rider. Its preferred regime is the two-bloc regime in which the EU cooperates with Japan 
and the US with Russia, and its second-best option is also a regime in which China free-rides. China’s  
  14
most preferred regime when it participates in a climate coalition is the one in which China cooperates 
(and trades) with the US, whilst a second cooperative bloc is formed by the Annex B-US coalition. The 
possibility of an Asian bloc appears to restrict its potential advantage with respect to gains from the 
emission market.   
 
Finally, the FSU is penalised by China’s participation in a climate regime because China has lower 
marginal abatement costs and therefore replaces Russia as the large supplier of emission permits. 
Therefore, the FSU would like to avoid coalitions in which China also participates. The FSU’s most 
preferred regime is the Annex B-US coalition, where China is not involved and Russia therefore 
represents the only permit seller. 
 
Table 1b. The ranking of climate regimes according to domestic total welfare: CHN and FSU 
 
CHN FSU 
(JPN, EU) & (USA, FSU)  (JPN, EU) 
(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)  (USA, JPN, EU, FSU) 
(JPN, EU, FSU)  (JPN, EU, FSU) 
(JPN, EU)  (JPN, EU, FSU) & (USA, CHN) 
(EU, FSU)  (JPN, EU, CHN, FSU) 
(JPN, EU, FSU) & (USA, CHN)  (EU, FSU) 
(USA, JPN, EU, CHN, FSU)  (JPN, CHN) & (EU, FSU) 
(JPN, EU, CHN, FSU)  (JPN, EU) & (USA, FSU) 




What are the policy lessons that can be derived from Tables 1a and 1b? As seen above, US and China 
have a strong incentive to free-ride, namely to set their environmental policy unilaterally, thus 
profiting from the abatement levels set for the Kyoto coalition countries. In particular, the Annex B-US 
coalition is the US’s most preferred regime and has been ranked third by China. The Annex B-US 




EU and Japan have a strong incentive to maintain cooperation with a large permit seller, e.g. at least 
with the FSU. Indeed, the worst coalition structures for the EU and for Japan are the ones in which the 
EU and Japan form a coalition without either China or the FSU.  
 
In short, the climate coalition structure where only the EU, Japan and the FSU cooperate is fairly 
robust in terms of economic incentives (even though not stable), but highly ineffective from an 
environmental viewpoint, as is demonstrated by Table 2. Paradoxically, this regime is not very 
welcome by the EU and Japan, but is among the most preferred ones by the other countries.  
 
What could be an alternative climate regime with some economic incentives for the participating 
countries/regions? It is clear that Russia does not like to cooperate with China, because of the losses 
that it would suffer in the permit market. China would like to free ride, but if it cooperates, it prefers 
the coalition structure  [(JPN, EU, FSU), (USA, CHN)]. Likewise for the US. The EU would prefer a 
large coalition, whereas Japan likes a regional two-bloc coalition (when it does not free ride). 
Therefore, if the US and China would decide to cooperate to control their GHG emissions, they may 
sign a bilateral agreement rather than joining a large global coalition. The conclusion is that the 
coalition structure [(JPN, EU, FSU), (USA, CHN)] has some likelihood to replace the existing 
coalition structure [(JPN, EU, FSU), USA, CHN], even though the latter is fairly robust. 
 
Let us look at the coalition structure [(JPN, EU, FSU), (USA, CHN)] in more detail. Is it profitable to 
all countries? Is it environmentally effective? Are there elements in the actual policy process that 
suggest that this coalition structure may not be unrealistic? Let us first look at this latter aspect. 
China’s decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol demonstrates that the country is aware that benefits from 
ratification could be high because China is the largest permit seller. Chinese officials emphasise that 
the government will voluntarily try to restrict the growth of CO2 emissions, but is strictly opposing 
binding GHG reduction targets (The Japan Times, Jan. 26
th, 2002), notwithstanding recent signals that 
the country might soften its position in the future. Overall, the Chinese strategy appears to be strongly 
linked to the moves of the US, and together these two countries could accomplish a break-through in 
international climate cooperation. 
 
Without binding commitments or with very mild abatement targets and given the consequent high 
amount of permits which can be supplied, China is a very attractive partner in climate change control 
activities. This is why the US could convince China to cooperate under a joint climate pact. In this 
way, the US could achieve two goals: (i) satisfy domestic political requirements by involving 
developing countries in their climate strategy; (ii) reap high benefits from a large joint emissions 
market (the US and China together account for more than one-third of the world-wide CO2 emissions 
and this share is becoming larger and larger). In particular, the US could drastically decrease its  
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abatement costs through emission trading, and China could profit from selling a large amount of 
permits.  
 
What are the main economic and environmental implications of this coalition structure? Figure 1 
below shows that both the US and CHN lose with respect to the case in which they free-ride. 
Therefore the coalition structure is not profitable. However, the loss for the US is small and could be 
largely compensated by some ancillary benefits from GHG emission abatement that are not taken into 
account in our model.  
 



















The loss for China is also small and ancillary benefits, both on the environmental and economic side, 
could be large. Note that, as discussed above, this coalitions structure is the most preferred one by both 
the US and China when they do not free-ride. Namely, it is the most preferred one among those in 
which they undertake some cooperative emission abatement. 
 
The coalitions structure [(JPN, EU, FSU), (USA, CHN)] is slightly beneficial for the Kyoto climate 
bloc consisting of the European Union, Japan and the FSU, because of the enhanced environmental 

























benchmark case (see Figure 1). This two-bloc climate regime is also characterised by a large 
expansion of China’s R&D investments. China over-invests in R&D to increase its sales in the 
bilateral emission trading market. The segmentation of the trading market explains why R&D 
investments within the benchmark Annex B-US coalition do not change. However, if the comparison is 
made with the coalition (Annex B-US + China), then it can be seen that R&D investments in this 
climate regime are higher for all Annex B-US countries. The reason is again the larger marginal 
abatement costs when China is not a seller in the permit market. This induces higher investments in 
R&D in the EU and Japan and also strategic R&D investments in the FSU, which will find it optimal 
to increase its supply of permits. 
 
Summing up, the coalition structure [(JPN, EU, FSU), (USA, CHN)] is neither stable nor profitable 
according to the definitions of Section 2 of this paper. However, it is profitable and stable for the 
coalition (JPN, EU, FSU). China and the US suffer a small loss when cooperating inside this coalition 
structure, but the loss is the smallest one among all possible coalition structures in which the US and 
China cooperate.  
 
The above conclusions are based on a decentralised analysis of each country’s incentives to join a 
climate coalition. However, it would be important to assess what a central planner would do when 
his/her goal is the maximisation of global welfare. The answer is provided by Table 2, second column, 
which shows that global welfare – which includes welfare of free-riders – is maximised when the 
coalition structure [(JPN, EU, CHN, FSU), USA] forms
§§§. Second is the coalition structure [(JPN, 
CHN), (EU, FSU), USA], whereas the climate regime where the US cooperates with China and the 
Annex B-US forms as a second bloc, i.e. [(JPN, EU, FSU), (USA, CHN)], is only sixth. Notice, that 
global welfare seems to be maximised when the US does not belong to a climate coalition, which 
suggests that an unconstrained growth of the US economy may be beneficial to the world economy, 
despite the damage to the environment.  
Table 2. The ranking of climate regimes according to global welfare and global GHG emissions  
 
Global GHG Emissions  Global Welfare 
(USA, JPN, EU, CHN, FSU)  (JPN, EU, CHN, FSU) 
(JPN, EU, FSU) & (USA, CHN)  (JPN, CHN) & (EU, FSU) 
(JPN, EU) & (USA, FSU)  (EU, FSU) 
(USA, JPN, EU, FSU)  (JPN, EU, FSU) 
                                                      
§§§ The fact that the grand coalition does not appear first in the ranking of global welfare is due to the exemption 
of ROW from future emission abatement commitments, i.e. in our analysis ROW is always a free rider.  
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(JPN, CHN) & (EU, FSU)  (USA, JPN, EU, CHN, FSU) 
(JPN, EU, FSU)  (JPN, EU, FSU) & (USA, CHN) 
(JPN, EU, CHN, FSU)  (JPN, EU) 
(EU, FSU)  (USA, JPN, EU, FSU) 
(JPN, EU)  (JPN, EU) & (USA, FSU) 
 
 
Also notice that the two-bloc climate regime [(JPN, EU, FSU), (USA, CHN)] would provide the 
second largest possible benefit for the environment (see Figure 2, first column). 
 
Summarising, if for some environmental, economic or political reasons, the US and China decide to 
cooperate to control their GHG emissions, the probability to sign a bilateral agreement rather than 
joining a large global coalition is quite high. This situation, which corresponds to the coalition 
structure [(JPN, EU, FSU), (USA, CHN)], slightly increases welfare in the EU, Japan and the FSU, at 
least with respect to the present Kyoto coalition (see Figure 1). Therefore, the Annex B-US countries 
may accept a two bloc regime, where the US and CHN cooperate on emission abatement and trade 
permits in a bilateral permit market. The economic loss for the US and CHN would be small with 
respect to the situation in which they free-ride, but the global environmental benefits would be large.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
The conclusions emerging from the above analysis can be summarised as follows. A move from the 
present climate regime in which the US and China do not cooperate to reduce their GHG emissions is 
not likely, at least in the short-run. The US is more likely to adopt unilateral policies than to join a 
coalition to control GHG emissions. However, it is unlikely that, at least in the medium term, the US 
continues to reject any form of cooperation on climate change control. If the US decides to cooperate, 
the climate regime which is least opposed (in terms of net economic benefits) by the negotiating 
countries is the one in which China and the US cooperate bilaterally and the Annex B-US countries 
form a parallel coalition. 
 
Of course, the above findings must be taken cautiously. First, because they are based only on the 
analysis of economic incentives, whereas political decisions could be taken on the basis of other types 
of incentives. Second, because we did not account for the link between climate negotiations and other 
international negotiation processes (e.g. on crime, trade, terrorism, technology, etc.). Third, because 
the FEEM-RICE model used in this study is a simplified representation of the world economic system, 
even though it captures the main economic mechanisms and the related incentive schemes. Additional 
research with other models would be beneficial.  
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Nonetheless, the results derived from the empirical analysis proposed in this paper are quite consistent 
with suggestions and results proposed in the game-theory literature (where countries’ asymmetries are 
usually neglected). This suggests that the analysis in this paper is likely to capture the relevant 
economic incentives and may therefore serve to provide indications on the prospective future 
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Appendix: The FEEM-RICE Model 
 
The FEEM-RICE model is an extension of Nordhaus and Yang’s (1996) regional RICE model of 
integrated assessment, which is one of the most popular and manageable integrated assessment tools 
for the study of climate change (see, for instance, Eyckmans and Tulkens 2002). It is basically a single 
sector optimal growth model which has been extended to incorporate the interaction between 
economic activities and climate. One such model has been developed for each macro region into 
which the world is divided (USA, Japan, Europe, China, Former Soviet Union, and Rest of the World). 
 
Within each region a central planner chooses the optimal paths of fixed investment and emission 
abatement that maximise the present value of per capita consumption. Output (net of climate change) 
is used for investment and consumption and is produced according to  constant returns Cobb-Douglas 
technology, which combines the inputs from capital and labour with the level of technology. 
Population (taken to be equal to full employment) and technology levels grow over time in an 
exogenous fashion, whereas capital accumulation is governed by the optimal rate of investment. There 
is a wedge between output gross and net of climate change effects, the size of which is dependent 
upon the amount of abatement (rate of emission reduction) as well as the change in global 
temperature. The model is completed by three equations representing emissions (which are related to 
output and abatement), carbon cycle (which relates concentrations to emissions), and climate module 
(which relates the change in temperature relative to 1990 levels to carbon concentrations) respectively. 
 
In our extension of the model, technical change is no longer exogenous. Instead, the issue of 
endogenous technical change is tackled by following the ideas contained in both Nordhaus (1999) and 
Goulder and Mathai (2000) and accordingly modifying Nordhaus and Yang’s (1996) RICE model. 
Doing so requires the input of a number of additional parameters, some of which have been estimated 
using information provided by Coe and Helpman (1995), while the remaining parameters were 
calibrated so as to reproduce the business-as-usual scenario generated by the RICE model with 
exogenous technical change. 
 
In particular, the following factors are included: first, endogenous technical change affecting factor 
productivity is introduced. This is done by adding the stock of knowledge in each production function 
and by relating the stock of knowledge to R&D investments. Second, induced technical change is 
introduced, by allowing the stock of knowledge to affect  the emission-output ratio as well. Finally, 
international technological spillovers are also accounted for in the model. 
 
To determine the optima value of all control variables, including their own GHG abatement strategy, 
countries play a non-cooperative Nash game in a dynamic setting, which yields an Open Loop Nash  
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equilibrium (see Eyckmans and Tulkens, 2002, for an explicit derivation of first order conditions of 
the optimum problem). This is a situation in which, in each region, the planner maximises social 
welfare subject to the individual resource and capital constraints and the climate module, given the 
emission and investment strategies (in the base case) and the R&D expenditure strategy (in the 
endogenous technological change case) of all other players. 
 
The Standard Model without Induced Technical Change 
 
As  previously mentioned, it is assumed for the purpose of this model that innovation is brought about 
by R&D spending which contributes to the accumulation of the stock of existing knowledge. 
Following an approach pioneered by Griliches (1979, 1984), it is assumed that the stock of knowledge 
is a factor of production, which therefore enhances the rate of productivity (see also the discussion in 
Weyant 1997; Weyant and Olavson 1999). In this formulation, R&D efforts prompt non-
environmental technical progress, but with different modes and elasticities. More precisely, the RICE 
production function output is modified as follows: 
 
  ] ) , ( ) , ( [ ) , ( ) , ( ) , (
1 γ γ β − = t n K t n L t n K t n A t n Q F R
n       ( 1 )  
 
where Q is output (gross of climate change effects), A the exogenously given level of technology and 
KR, L, and KF are respectively the inputs from knowledge capital, labour, and physical capital. 
In (1), the stock of knowledge has a region-specific output elasticity equal to βn (n=1,…6). It should 
be noted that, as long as this coefficient is positive, the output production process is characterised by 
increasing returns to scale, in line with current theories of endogenous growth. This implicitly assumes 
the existence of cross-sectoral technological spillovers within each country (Romer, 1990). In 
addition, it should be noted that while allowing for R&D-driven technological progress, we maintain 
the possibility that technical improvements can also be determined exogenously (the path of A is the 
same as that specified in the original RICE model). The stock accumulates in the usual fashion: 
 
  ) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( & ) 1 , ( t n K t n D R t n K R R R δ − + = +        ( 2 )  
 
where  R&D is the expenditure in Research and Development and δR is the rate of knowledge 
depreciation. Finally, it is recognised that some resources are absorbed by R&D spending. That is: 
 
  ) , ( & ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( t n D R t n I t n C t n Y + + =        ( 3 )  
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where Y is net output (net of climate change effects as specified in the RICE model), C is consumption 
and I gross fixed capital formation. 
At this stage the model maintains the same emissions function as Nordhaus’ RICE model which will 
be modified in the next section: 
 
  ) , ( )] , ( 1 )[ , ( ) , ( t n Q t n t n t n E μ σ − =         ( 4 )  
 
where σ can be loosely defined as the emissions-output ratio, E stands for emissions and μ for the rate 
of abatement effort. The policy variables included in the model are rates of fixed investment and of 
emission abatement. For the other variables, the model specifies a time path of exogenously given 
values. Interestingly, this is also the case for technology level A and of the emissions-output ratio σ. 
Thus, the model presented so far assumes no induced technical change, i.e. an exogenous 
environmental technical change, and a formulation of productivity that evolves both exogenously and 
endogenously. In the model, investment fosters economic growth (thereby driving up emissions) while 
abatement is the only policy variable used for reducing emissions. 
 
Induced Technical Change 
 
In the second step of our model formulation, endogenous environmental technical change is accounted 
for. It is assumed that the stock of knowledge – which in the previous formulation was only a factor of 
production - also serves the purpose of reducing, ceteris paribus, the level of carbon emissions. Thus, 
in the second formulation, R&D efforts prompt both environmental and non-environmental technical 
progress, although with different modes and elasticities.
**** More precisely, the RICE emission-output 
relationship is modified as follows: 
 
  ) , ( )] , ( 1 ))][ , ( exp( [ ) , ( t n Q t n t n K t n E R n n n μ α χ σ − − + =      ( 4 ’ )  
 
In (4’), knowledge reduces the emissions-output ratio with an elasticity of αn, which is also region-
specific; the parameter χn is a scaling coefficient, whereas σn is the value to which the emission-output 
ratio tends asymptotically as the stock of knowledge increases without limit. In this formulation, R&D 
contributes to output productivity on the one hand, and affects the emission-output ratio - and 
therefore the overall level of pollution emissions - on the other . 
                                                      
**** Obviously, we could have introduced two different types of R&D efforts, respectively contributing to the 
growth of an environmental knowledge stock and a production knowledge stock. Such undertaking however is 
made difficult by the need  to specify variables and calibrate  parameters for which there is no immediately 




Previous formulations do not include the effect of potential spillovers produced by knowledge, and 
therefore ignore the fact that both technologies and organisational structures disseminate   
internationally. Modern economies are linked by vast and continually expanding flows of trade, 
investment, people and ideas. The technologies and choices of one region are and will inevitably be 
affected by developments in other regions. 
 
Following the work of Weyant and Olavson (1999), who suggest that the definition of spillovers in  an 
induced technical change context be kept plain and simple (in the light of a currently incomplete 
understanding of the problem) , disembodied, or knowledge spillovers are modelled (see Romer, 
1990). They refer to the R&D carried out and paid for by one party that produces benefits to other 
parties which then have better or more inputs than before or can somehow benefit from R&D carried 
out elsewhere. Therefore, in order to capture international spillovers of knowledge, the stock of world 
knowledge is introduced in the third version of the FEEM-RICE model, both in the production 
function and in the emission-output ratio equation. Equations (1) and (4’) are then revised as follows: 
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As mentioned above, throughout the analysis we assume the adoption of efficient policies. As a 
consequence, the model also includes the possibility of emission trading. When running the model in 
the presence of emission trading, two additional equations are considered: 
  
  27
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which replaces equation (3) and: 
 
  ) , ( ) ( ) , ( t n NIP n Kyoto t n E + =                   ( 6 )  
 
where NIP(n,t) is the net demand for permits and Kyoto(n) are the emission targets set in the Kyoto 
Protocol for the signatory countries and the BAU levels for the non-signatory ones. According to (3’), 
resources produced by the economy must be devoted, in addition to consumption, investment, and 
research and development, to net purchases of emission permits. Equation (6) states that a region’s 
emissions may exceed the limit set in Kyoto if permits are bought, and vice versa in the case of sales 
of permits. Note that p(t) is the price of a unit of tradable emission permits expressed in terms of the 
numeraire output price. Moreover, there is an additional policy variable to be considered in this case, 
which is net demand for permits NIP. 
 
In terms of the possibility of emission trading, the sequence whereby a Nash equilibrium is reached 
can be described as follows. Each region maximises its utility subject to  its individual resource and 
capital constraints, now including the Kyoto constraint, and the climate module for a given emission 
(i.e. abatement) strategy of all the other players and a given price of permits p(0) (in the first round 
this is set at an arbitrary level). When all regions have made their optimal choices, the overall net 
demand for permits is computed at the given price. If the sum of net demands in each period is 
approximately zero, a Nash equilibrium is obtained; otherwise the price is revised as a function of the 
market disequilibrium and each region’s decision process starts again. 
 